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 1 
‘EDUCATION, EDUCATION, EDUCATION’: LEGAL, MORAL AND 
CLINICAL 
 
Donald Nicolson 
University of Strathclyde 
 
On the assumption that law schools should seek to foster a legal profession which 
takes ethics seriously, this article explores how it may promote the moral development 
of its students. Having examined how legal education currently fails in this regards, it 
explores competing psychological theories of moral development and argues that law 
schools should seek to start students on a ‘moral apprenticeship’ leading to the 
development of the necessary moral character to equip them for the ethical challenges 
of practice. The article then looks at the extent to which ideal methods for promoting 
moral development can be executed given the current climate in legal education. In 
particular, it argues that an excellent and viable means of assisting in the process of 
moral character development is through student involvement in extra-curricular law 
clinics.  
 
Introduction 
 
Thanks to the relative explosion of academic interest in lawyers’ ethics over the last 
two decades in the UK most of the main normative issue of professional legal ethics 
have been debated, and work has also begun on how lawyers actually behave and how 
best to regulate the profession.1  However, probably because it is the one issue over 
which academics have substantial influence, it is the teaching of legal ethics that has 
received most attention. Indeed, given that answers to the central dilemmas of 
professional ethics remain essentially contested, one does not have to accept the 
postmodernist position that there are never correct (as opposed to better) answers to 
moral questions, to recognise that academics have an important role to play in 
ensuring that prospective lawyers at least are aware of issues of professional ethics 
and their possible solutions and better still to care about ‘doing the right thing’.  
 Obviously, this assumes that professional ethics matters. Here, it can be 
argued that, as gatekeepers to and guardians of the law, lawyers influence access to 
law and the quality of legal representation. Moreover, in applying, interpreting and 
even making law they can do great harm to opponents, third parties, the environment, 
the administration of justice or law itself. How they perform these roles is, or ought to 
be, the subject of professional ethics. Consequently, whether concerned about access 
to justice, law’s justice or simply with understanding how law operates, attention to 
lawyers’ ethics seems essential to a liberal legal education.2 Such attention is even 
more obvious to those who reject as artificial and invidious the division between an 
academic and vocational legal education in favour of an earlier conception of a liberal 
legal education as including the preparation of lawyers for practice.3 Law schools can 
thus be said to fail students if they do not prepare them for the ethical dilemmas, and 
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the pressures and temptations to act unethically, that they will face in practice.4 
Forewarned, graduates can seek careers which are more compatible with their moral 
values. This, it is argued, increases the chances of career satisfaction and decreases 
those of the psychological alienation and emotional stress associated with current 
conceptions of lawyers as amoral technicians.5 In any event, exposing students to a 
wide variety of ethical considerations and the obstacles to ethical behaviour thrown up 
by modern legal practice may equip them to cope more effectively with those 
dilemmas and obstacles they meet once in practice. Finally, raising ethical standards 
will enable lawyers to re-assert their professional status in the face of increasing 
commercialisation and bureacratisation in legal practice. Thus, ethics education might 
encourage lawyers to go beyond more technical conceptions of professionalism to 
display what might be called ethical professionalism, which involves an altruistic 
commitment to helping those in need and treating clients in a sensitive, engaged and 
empathetic manner.6   
This article explores how these goals might be best achieved in the light, first, 
of recent research into moral psychology and, secondly, what is possible in the current 
legal educational context. It argues that to have a lasting effect on moral behaviour, 
legal education needs to concentrate on adapting students’ moral character to enable 
them to face the ethical challenges of contemporary legal practice, and that the most 
effective way of achieving this task is through live-client law clinics. While the 
connection between law clinics and moral development is already well-recognised, I 
will propose a clinical model which addresses the reality of limited education budgets 
and maximises the clinical experience both in terms of student numbers and length of 
involvement. To being with, however, we need an idea of existing ethical teaching. 
 
The Current Position7  
 
Notwithstanding sporadic calls for professional ethics to be taught at the academic 
stage of legal education,8 only roughly a quarter of UK law schools do so on a 
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compulsory basis.9 Admittedly, as interest in ethics, clinical legal education and skills 
teaching grows, legal ethics is increasingly been taught in optional, or as part of  
compulsory, courses. However, most students first encounter professional ethics in 
the vocational stage. Not only is this experience divorced from the aims of a liberal 
legal education, but it is both too little and too late, especially as only barristers must 
include professional ethics as part of continuing professional development.10   
 
The Academic Stage: Ethics in the Hidden Curriculum 
 
Ethics teaching in the vocational stage is too late because, while most undergraduates 
are not explicitly taught ethics, they all learn about ethics, legal practice and 
professional roles from what is variously called the hidden,11 latent,12 implicit13 or 
informal14 curriculum, which supplements and may be as powerful as the formal 
curriculum. Thus, notwithstanding the shrinking dominance of black-letter 
scholarship and the growth of ‘law and…’ courses, it is probably true to say that 
undergraduate legal education remains focused on teaching ‘the law’ and ‘how to 
think like a lawyer’. Yet, whether consciously or not, academics constantly convey 
messages about justice and ethics.15 Unfortunately, the lesson tends to be that such 
issues are unimportant. This is imparted by their low visibility in the formal 
curriculum, especially whenever questions about lawyers’ ethics, justice and the 
impact of law on people’s lives cry out for discussion, but are ignored, or when 
students are told to not to confuse their emotional or moral responses to law with the 
central question of what it is. This combination of the separation of law and justice, 
and the relegation of the latter to ‘soft’, and often optional, subjects like jurisprudence 
is likely to lead to an uncritical acceptance of law’s underlying values as neutral and 
objective, and that law is justice and moral behaviour merely that which is legal. As 
an alternative to this legalistic morality, an educational focus on developing technical 
and argumentative skills in relation to malleable law and facts might lead students to 
abandon ideas of right and wrong in favour of an instrumental morality in which their 
only goal is success and the only constraints pragmatic. Either way, there is little to 
challenge the standard conception of lawyers as legal technicians, ‘hired guns’ or, less 
pejoratively, neutral partisans, whose function is confined to manipulating law and 
facts in the interests of paying clients.16 Equally, the concentration on legal reasoning 
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as an exercise in dispassionate and abstract logic distracts attention away from law’s 
human and emotional side, while the emphasis on case law portrays law as primarily a 
means of dispute resolution through adversarial combat.    
The dominant message about law, justice and ethics conveyed by the content 
of teaching is reinforced by its didactic style. Being treated as passive learners, 
students are encouraged to defer to authority rather than develop critical faculties.  
The increasingly competitive nature of legal education in terms of admissions, results 
and obtaining employment echoes the competitive individualism celebrated by law, 
while the increasing expense of a university education encourages students to see it as 
a short-term investment for long-term financial gain. The channelling of students into 
lucrative law careers rather than those devoted to helping the vulnerable is reinforced 
by the preponderance of law subjects involving the interests of the rich and powerful, 
by large law firms’ dominance of the recruitment process, and by informal messages 
about legal careers provided by staff and fellow students. However, while many 
academics may portray a career in large law firms or at the Bar as the height of 
ambition, others may engender student cynicism by openly disparaging lawyers as 
mindless form-fillers and grubby money seekers. This leaves little space for the 
conception of lawyer as heroes, bent on seeking justice and helping those in need.17  
Absent empirical research, it is difficult to gauge the precise effect of this 
hidden curriculum on UK law students.18 However, extensive research in the US19 
shows that legal education there tends to undermine student idealism about using law 
to promote justice and to engender moral and political cynicism, and a propensity 
towards ethically dubious behaviour.20 If UK law schools have a similar effect, and 
there is no reason to think otherwise, there seems to be little one ethics course at the 
vocational stage can do to counter the hidden curriculum conveyed for up to four 
years of an undergraduate degree.  
 
The Vocational Stage: Too Little And Too Late 
 
In any event, vocational ethics teaching does little more than introduce students to the 
formal conduct rules found in the professional codes, common law and legislation. 
Thus, instruction manuals almost entirely ignore academic criticism of dominant 
notions of professionalism and professional role morality.21 Recruited largely from 
practice, tutors are also likely to be ignorant of this literature, while their years in 
practice and own legal education will have done little to encourage them to take 
ethics, rather than just professional norms, seriously. However, even if tutors are 
willing22 and able to go beyond the rules, they have little time to do so. Whereas in 
Scotland and on some Bar Vocational Courses, professional ethics is given equal 
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 Cf A. Goldsmith, ‘Heroes or Technicians? The Moral Capacities of Tomorrow’s Lawyers’ (14) 
Journal of Professional Legal Education 1; A. Sherr, ‘Of Super Heroes and Slaves: Images and Work 
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status with other subjects and students are required to apply the rules to hypothetical 
factual scenarios and sometimes even in simulated practice settings, more frequently 
it receives a few introductory lectures, after which it is taught pervasively. This tends 
to result in ethics being squeezed out by skills development and other pervasive 
topics. Not only does this symbolically devalue ethics, but, taking their cue from the 
manuals on substantive subjects, which either ignore ethical issues or simply 
reproduce code provisions, tutors are likely to concentrate solely on ensuring that 
students know the rules.23   
Leaving aside the philosophical argument that reducing ethics to ‘mindless 
conformity’ to externally set rules is an inferior form, if not a total denial of, 
morality,24 moral psychology shows how far legal education falls short in preparing 
students for ethical practice. Following Rest, it has become accepted that moral 
behaviour (whatever its content) requires the engagement, though not necessarily 
consciously or chronologically, of four psychological components.25 Moral sensitivity 
enables individuals to recognise moral problems when they arise. Having identified a 
moral issue, moral judgment enables individuals to identify its salient features, and to 
select and justify appropriate responses. However, empirical research repeatedly 
confirms that knowing what is morally right by no means guarantees moral 
behaviour.26 Moral motivation is required to ensure that individuals want to put into 
effect the moral solution selected and elevate it over competing considerations like 
self-interest or organisational and institutional values. Finally, even if individuals care 
about converting ethical judgment into action, they require the moral courage to be 
able to resist temptations to compromise moral standards. Crucial here are moral 
fibre, steadfastness, perseverance, backbone, or what psychologists call ego-strength, 
as well as the ability to set goals and focus one’s attention.27 
This suggests that current legal education only partially equips students for 
ethical practice.28 Prima facie, knowledge and understanding of the rules should assist 
them to identify and resolve ethical problems. However, the codes of both Scottish 
professional branches and that of English and Welsh barristers eschew detailed 
regulation in favour of vague aspirational admonitions and general principles.29 
Admittedly, lawyers can seek guidance from professional bodies, but without prior 
exposure to the specific problems this might only occur once they are already 
inextricably entangled. The more detailed rules governing English and Welsh 
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solicitors are better in this regard,30 but still suffer from the inevitably limited 
imagination of their framers, the rapidly changing nature of legal practice and society, 
conflicting rules, and the inherent ambiguity and vagueness of the language in which 
they are drafted. Moreover, even comprehensive and clear rules can never be 
sufficiently sophisticated to cope with the contextual nuances and particularities of 
every unique fact situation. Consequently, whether codes are detailed or not, moral 
judgment is always required to supplement and apply their norms. Here, current 
ethical education fails in two respects.  
First, it does little to assist students develop their own sense of ethical 
professionalism. Without exposure to the extensive legal ethics literature, they are 
unlikely to grapple with issues such as the meaning of professionalism, the 
justification for neutral partisanship, and the limits to lawyer zeal, confidentiality and 
lawyer paternalism. Without exposure to ethical theories which underlie and inform 
professional legal ethics, students lack the intellectual tools to help resolve ethical 
dilemmas which are not covered by the rules or professional conventions.  
Secondly, current education does little to engage student’s affective capacities. 
Judgment is not confined to rationally working out which duty best fits a moral 
dilemma and how it should be applied. It also involves a ‘perceptual capacity’31 which 
enables individuals to respond to the unique circumstances of each situation by 
drawing upon empathy, compassion and imagination, as well as their past experiences 
and entire world-view.32 Affective faculties also sensitise lawyers to moral issues, and 
motivate them to act morally33 and to implement moral decisions with ‘warmth, 
empathy, compassion, and connectedness’, rather than in a ‘cool, distant or autocratic 
manner’.34  
Current ethical teaching fails most dramatically in relation to moral 
motivation. Indeed, the focus on the formal rules further reinforces the hidden 
curriculum’s message about lawyer (a)morality. Most obviously, in being premised on 
neutral partisanship, and lacking substantial concern for the impact of lawyer 
behaviour on opponents, third parties or the general public, the codes confirm that, 
aside from protecting clients’ material interests and upholding the proper and efficient 
administration of justice, issues of morality, justice and unmet legal need are not 
central to the professional role, and require no more than adherence to formal state 
and professional norms.35  Similarly, those norms that favour lawyers’ own interests 
over those of clients and the general public are likely to reinforce the perception that 
legal practice involves making a good living rather than helping others, whereas  
norms which are too vague to impose real behavioural limits suggest that lawyers are 
free to pursue whatever course of action best suits their own interests. But even 
detailed codes are likely to be seen by those with an instrumental morality as simply 
another set of rules to be manipulated. Accordingly, professional ethics may come to 
be seen as a matter of risk analysis ‘as to the level of malpractice at which they should 
operate in any given situation’.36 This attitude is likely to be reinforced by the 
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knowledge that sanctions for code breaches are rare because professional regulators 
do not seem overly concerned to pursue and punish wrongdoers,37 and in any event 
are hampered by the hidden nature of much lawyer misconduct and the likely 
unwillingness of lawyers to risk ostracisation or career impairment by reporting their 
colleagues or superiors.38  
Of course, not all students will see professional ethics as a question of being 
‘moral when [they] must and immoral when [they] can’.39 Those who adopt a 
legalistic morality are likely to see ethics as a matter of blind obedience to formal 
rules. While the rules may frequently fail to help them identify and resolve ethical 
problems, lawyers may conclude that they have acted morally when they have not 
broken any rule, especially as this avoids the anxiety that normally accompanies 
moral dilemmas.40 Moreover, mere knowledge of the rules does little to help students 
develop the necessary moral courage to resist the many temptations to flout the rules 
that arise in practice. Thus, the increasing commercialisation of practice places a 
premium on prioritising moral over financial considerations, competition for 
promotion and organisational hierarchies make it difficult to challenge the moral 
judgment of superiors, while the increasing specialisation and bureaucratisation of 
law firms encourages lawyers to see moral responsibility as that of everyone but 
themselves.41 These problems may be exacerbated by the deference that legal 
neophytes are likely to show towards experienced colleagues, especially training 
partners and pupil/devil-masters, and by the intense socialisation processes in 
practices which regularly flout the rules.42  
Legal education thus has a mountain to climb if it is going to positively 
influence the morality of aspirant lawyers, particularly as regards moral motivation 
and courage. However, a final reason why it currently does not even reach the 
foothills is that it lacks a plausible psychological model. Unless it is naively assumed 
that lawyers will obey the rules simply because they are the rules, it would seem that 
ethical behaviour is thought to flow from the threat of sanctions for breach. This 
approach is associated with various, now discredited, psychological approaches such 
as behaviourism and social learning theory which see morality developing from direct 
teaching, modelling by authority figures, and reinforcement by rewards and 
punishments.43 At best, this may inculcate conformity to externally imposed standards 
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out of habit. However, such inculcation works best with children, not young adults, 
and with rewards, rather than sanctions - still less with merely a threat of only 
irregularly imposed sanctions. Moreover, research clearly establishes that attempts to 
establish such extrinsic motivation are less effective than, and may actually erode, 
intrinsic motivation. Many resist being told what to do and even rewarding 
conformity suggests that morality is a means to an end rather than an ends itself – a 
message which is reinforced in social contexts like legal practice which reward 
outward success rather than virtue. Attempting to develop moral motivation from 
‘outside in’ is far more likely to be successful when little is at stake, social conditions 
are stable, and there is strong moral consensus. However, lawyers face constantly 
changing social conditions, myriad pressures to act unethically and a community 
consensus fractured by the fragmented nature of the legal profession.44  
 
Ethical Education and Moral Psychology 
 
The Cognitive Approach 
 
It is widely recognised that effective ethical education helps morality to develop from 
‘inside out’ rather than ‘outside in’.45 Here, two main theories compete over how this 
is best achieved.46 The first is Kohlberg’s cognitive approach.47  
 Influenced by Piaget,48 and based on numerous experiments, Kohlberg argued 
that individual morality develops in three levels, each with two sub-stages.49 At the pre-
conventional level, individuals are ruled by self-interest, motivated first by threats of 
punishment and later the benefits gained from mutually beneficial exchanges. At the 
conventional level, they become genuinely concerned with others’ needs, first because 
they desire approval, and loyal and trusting relations, but later out of loyalty to social 
institutions, and respect for their rules and obligations. The post-conventional level 
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Approach’ in T. Lickone (ed), Moral Development and Behaviour, (New York, Holt, Rinerhart and 
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involves a principled approach to morality, with stage five largely correlating with 
utilitarianism, and stage six with a Kantian preference for universal, impartial and 
rationally derivable principles of justice involving respect for others’ rights.  
 Following a long philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato and Kant,50 
Kohlberg saw the key to moral development lying in cognition and the ability to 
reason about morality. He concluded from experiments that this ability can be 
enhanced by exposing individuals to reasoning at a higher stage than that currently 
displayed and by creating cognitive conflict through role plays and Socratic dialogues 
over dilemmas such as whether a dying woman’s husband should steal drugs to save 
her life. However, he found very few moral agents who reasoned at his sixth stage.  
 This, and the fact that not everyone’s morality develops in stages, has led to 
questions about the accuracy of Kohlberg’s theory and the argument that he was over-
eager to defeat ethical relativism.51 He also has been criticised for ‘taking sides’ against 
competing ethical theories and for relegating to the conventional level the allegedly 
more female ethic of care, which values connectedness, subjective feeling and reducing 
the pain of those in need. Others join with feminists in criticising Kohlberg’s focus on 
the form rather than content of moral reasoning, on questions of justice and rights, and 
life and death moral dilemmas, instead of the moral issues which arise in everyday life 
and particularly in interpersonal relations, and on abstract, intellectual responses to 
dilemmas involving imaginary characters, instead of contextually rich real-life 
situations where individuals are faced with myriad external and internal pressures to 
compromise their moral values. As already noted,52 moral agents might know what 
morality requires but lack the motivation or courage to convert such knowledge into 
behaviour. More specifically, as also noted,53 moral behaviour results as much from 
moral sentiments and emotions as rational judgment.   
 In later years, Kohlberg and his associates have addressed some of these 
criticisms. Thus the idea that morality develops according to a strict hierarchy ending 
with abstract conceptions of justice has been loosened.54  Kohlberg also conceded that 
cognitive competence does not necessarily translate into moral behaviour but 
nevertheless argued that it is necessary for and a facilitator of moral action. Latterly he 
became more interested in moral behaviour, ethical socialisation and Aristotle’s 
approach to moral education. This led to experiments with ‘just community’ schools, 
where giving pupils a democratic role in rule-setting and application engendered a sense 
of ‘ownership’ and hence greater commitment to these rules.55 Finally, Kohlberg 
                                               
50
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acknowledged that emotion influences moral behaviour, though he maintained that 
affective development parallels, and hence can be read off from, cognitive 
development.56  
But even if true, Kohlberg failed to explain why this should be so and more 
importantly how cognition relates to other psychological processes, such as memory, 
information processing, and motivation, and how moral behaviour is affected by 
personalogical and situational variables.57 Moreover, his ‘phenomenalistic’ assumption 
that moral behaviour requires the explicit exercise of conscious judgment conflicts with 
evidence that much of our socio-cognitive activity is tacit, implicit, and automatic,58 
and that individuals are often unable to explain what moral judgments motivated their 
actions.59 Indeed, automatic or subconscious responses to moral issues are said to be 
essential to coping effectively with everyday life; otherwise there would be 
insufficient time left to deal with that which is novel and unusual.60  
 
The Virtues of Character 
 
As a result Kohlberg’s cognitive approach has fallen out of favour and psychologists 
are joining moral philosophers in revisiting the Aristotelian tradition of virtue (or 
aretaic) ethics.61 Unlike the deontic tradition, exemplified by Kantian deontology but 
also by various forms of consequentialism, which sees ethics in terms of universally 
applicable principles or rules imposing behavioural duties, virtue ethics sees morality 
as largely a question of a person’s overall moral worth and in particular their possession 
of relatively stable character traits, dispositions, or habits of perception, feeling and 
behaviour which are regarded as virtuous. Virtue ethics recognises that individuals are 
not born with developed virtues, nor with the ‘practical wisdom’ which enables them to 
see how to act in practical situations. Instead, virtue, practical wisdom and a person’s 
overall moral character are gradually developed through actual engagement with moral 
issues.  
However, Aristotle did not dismiss moral rules as unimportant. He 
acknowledged that they may ground important decisions and that character 
development starts with an application of rules before reaching the point where it 
involves instinctive and spontaneous moral responses.62 Interestingly, Aristotle’s view 
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 11 
that children first obey rules out of fear and later shame and the desire for conformity is 
similar to Piaget, Kohlberg and other stage theorists. However, his view of moral 
education and moral maturity is very different.63 Thus, by emulating others, by trial and 
error, by instruction from authoritative others, by experiencing and reflecting on the 
appropriate pride or regret at the outcome of one’s actions, moral habits or dispositions 
are said to gradually develop to the point that appropriate moral behaviour and feelings 
become embedded in the individual’s character.64 In other words, character formation 
results not so much from direct teaching but from experience in moral behaviour, or 
what might be called a ‘moral apprenticeship’.65 As William James, puts it: ‘Every 
smallest stroke of virtue or vice leaves its never so little scar’.66 Moreover, strong 
moral character are more likely to develop where individuals are subjected to difficult 
and sustained challenges.67 
Recently, character development has been analogised to the way in which 
expertise is developed in other walks of life.68 Like other experts, those with developed 
moral characters tend to respond to moral issues more or less spontaneously and 
instinctively. However, this does not mean that they do so without intention or other 
forms of cognitive control.69 Indeed, Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom clearly 
contemplates that virtue requires mature reasoning and that habits can ‘involve complex 
activities in which deliberation and adaptability are required’.70 Moreover, virtuous 
people know what they are doing and choose virtuous conduct for its own sake.71   
If properly developed, moral character can be said to equip individuals with all 
four psychological components involved in moral behaviour rather than just the 
judgment and perhaps also sensitivity emphasised by moral cognitivists. Where moral 
motivation and courage are also developed to the extent that virtue becomes a way of 
life, moral behaviour is far more likely to ensue. Thus, moral ‘saints’, such as Gandhi, 
Mother Teresa, and Oskar Schindler, seem to act out of deep-seated and spontaneous 
feelings of compassion, empathy, etc – by ‘habits of the heart’ – rather than conscious 
deliberation. This is confirmed by studies of moral exemplars who acted more or less 
automatically.72 According to contemporary psychologists, this automaticity derives 
from the fact that frequent activation renders moral considerations and categories part 
of the easily (or ‘chronically’) accessible set of cognitive-affective constructs which 
‘encompass the person’s encoding or construal of the self and of situations, enduring 
goals, expectations and feeling states, as well as specific memories of the people and 
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events that have been experienced’.73 For such individuals moral categories are 
‘salient, chronically accessible, easily primed and readily utilized.’74 And on the basis 
of the insight that ‘what we see depends on who we are,’75 and on empirical studies, it 
is argued that moral behaviour is more likely for those for whom moral considerations 
are central to their personal identity and sense of self.76 For such individuals, immoral 
behaviour will diminish and moral behaviour enhance their sense of self and self-
esteem. Indeed, following Aristotle, Blasi argues that where moral motivations are 
central to the individual’s self-identity ‘moral action flows from a kind of spontaneous 
necessity’ without the need for willpower or moral courage to overcome temptations 
or pressures to act unethically.77  
 
Can Law Schools Influence Character?78 
 
Virtue ethics79 and moral psychology thus suggest that if law schools are to help make 
lawyers moral they should aim to ensure that ethical constructs and motivations 
become central to students’ self-identity and, through repeated use, their character.80 
Some,81 however, question whether law schools can influence character development 
particularly at this stage of students’ lives.82 Unfortunately, partly because 
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psychological concepts do not map neatly onto the philosophical language of 
character, psychological research has not directly sought to establish whether 
character becomes set by a particular age.83  On the other hand, some empirical 
research does indirectly suggest that character development is possible in adulthood 
and may indeed be affected by university education. Certainly, as we have seen,84 law 
schools may negatively affect student attitudes. More positively, studies by Kohlberg 
and his associates show that moral judgment continues to develop well into adulthood 
and that university education, particularly if accompanied by ethical instruction and 
involvement in community projects, can have a lasting effect.85 Admittedly, as 
already noted,86 moral reasoning does not necessarily translate into behaviour. 
However, there is some, albeit weak, connection between the two.87 And, if moral 
reasoning continues to develop at university why not other psychological 
components? In fact, research indicates a ‘college effect’ on moral sensitivity and the 
related capacity for moral imagination.88 Similarly, university provides ideal 
opportunities for the development of self-identity, which is so crucial to moral 
character, particularly as tertiary education tends to postpone important character 
forming events like marriage and career choice.89  
The potential for law schools to influence character development is further 
enhanced by the fact that, even if the self-identity and moral character of incoming 
law students are fairly well-formed, they will only have developed in relation to the 
sort of moral issues that arise in the family, friendships, school, sport, etc. Without 
exposure to the realities of legal practice, the type of ethical issues it raises and the 
moral considerations relevant to their resolution, students will have not begun to 
develop the professional identity, moral judgment and instinctive, spontaneous and 
habitual responses to professional moral problems that make lawyer morality much 
more likely. In other words, while they might have a developed personal moral 
character, they have yet to develop a professional moral character. And, as law 
teachers generally are the first to introduce them to the legal world, they have a 
unique opportunity to influence this process.90  
In terms of the above empirical research and commonsense ‘armchair 
psychology’,91 Kupperman’s view of character development seems plausible. He 
hypothesises that the outlines of character are formed in childhood, with late 
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adolescence and early adulthood involving fine-tuning and the filling in of detail, and 
further fine-tuning along perhaps with attempts at revision occurring in later 
adulthood. If accurate, this suggests that law schools may help students begin to 
develop the professional moral character which fills in the details relevant to legal 
practice left untouched by personal moral character.  
At the same time, without the sort of life-changing events experienced by 
those like St Francis and John Profumo, radical character transformation at university 
is unlikely. Students predisposed to immoral behaviour will not suddenly develop a 
moral conscience. And, unfortunately, research indicate that incoming law students 
are not predominantly altruistic, justice-oriented individuals.92 On the other hand, 
research also suggest that law schools do influence students’ social conscience, albeit 
currently in a negative direction,93 whereas many law teachers report that there are 
students who can be encouraged and guided to adapt what is virtuous in everyday life 
to professional life.94 Given that students differ as to the content and obduracy of their 
moral outlook, we might usefully distinguish between: 
• The Sinners: a very small group, who are irredeemably immoral – they are 
already inclined to lie, cheat, bully and oppress others in the service of their 
clients and themselves;  
• The Saints: a relatively small group of students with already developed 
virtuous characters – they want to act morally and use their skills to help 
others, and require only to be guided as to what virtue entails in legal practice.   
• Thatcher’s Children: possibly the largest group – they are not incorrigibly bad 
but tend towards amorality and the pursuit of self-interest, and will require 
considerable encouragement to take morality seriously.   
• The Moral Innocents: probably the second biggest group - with the right 
support they may develop a sense of ethical professionalism, but otherwise are 
likely to adopt the current norms of amoral professionalism.   
Using this typology, one might predict that, depending on the extent to which 
each student’s character is fixed on entering university, and the extent and nature of 
ethical education, there is a good chance of law schools providing the foundation for 
the development of commendable moral character amongst the Saints, some chance 
with the Moral Innocents, but no chance with the Sinners and little with Thatcher’s 
Children. Moreover, it is possible that starting even a small group on the road to 
ethical professionalism will have a knock-on effect. Students who have already started 
the journey might encourage newer colleagues to join them, whereas those in practice 
may provide both encouragement and role models for similarly disposed neophytes. 
This, in turn, may water down the generally amoral environment of legal practice and 
perhaps also lead to areas of practice or isolated environments within practice, such as 
ethical discussion groups,95 which provide sustenance and support for ethical 
professionalism. As research shows, those who display moral character tend to be 
involved in ongoing relationships with others who challenge, and thus sustain and 
expand, their sense of morality.96  
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Reforming Legal Education 
 
The Ideal  
 
Combining the lessons of moral psychology with the critique of legal education 
suggests that ethical education should have four aims: inspiring an interest in ethics;  
illuminating the general and professional ethical tools available to resolve issues of 
professional ethics; illustrating these tools and issues through exposure to situations 
involving moral dilemmas; and inculcating the habit of identifying, evaluating and 
caring about ethical issues so that this becomes a more or less spontaneous response 
in practice.  
As regards illuminating professional ethics, while it is not inappropriate to 
continue teaching the formal rules in the vocational stage, students should be exposed 
to legal ethics literature in the academic stage so that they first develop the ability to 
critically evaluate these rules and their underlying professional role morality, apply 
them in ways which are sensitive to the contexts of legal practice and fill in the gaps 
where they are silent, vague or conflicting. This literature is best understood if 
supported by an introduction to its philosophical underpinnings and the institutional 
setting in which lawyers operate.97 Students will be better equipped to evaluate 
current professional rules and roles if they appreciate the limitations of their 
underlying ethical theories. Furthermore, engaging with ethical theory may encourage 
clarity of thought and expression, force students to examine their instinctive responses 
to ethical dilemmas, inspire some to take ethics seriously and guide the decision-
making of those already converted.98 Exposure to the institutional context enables 
students to better appreciate legal ethics debates and helps prepare them for the 
realities of practice. Thus existing coverage of the adversarial system, the legal 
profession and access to justice needs to be augmented by exposure to the ways in 
which the increasing specialisation, fragmentation, bureaucratisation, 
commercialisation and globalisation of legal practice affect lawyers’ ability to act 
ethically99 and how professional regulation might be reformed to enhance ethical 
behaviour.100  
While the professional norms and their philosophical and institutional contexts 
can be taught in traditional lecture format, interactive teaching methods are more 
likely to inspire and help students develop their own moral stance. Here, Socratic 
dialogue, preferably in small classes, may not only produce deeper understanding of 
issues through exposure to a plurality of views,101 but also encourage students to see 
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ethical dialogue and reflection as a normal part of legal work.102 In addition, academic 
debates can be brought to life by exposure to legal biographies, fictional accounts of 
legal practice in literature, films and television103 or even vignettes scripted and 
filmed by academics,104 and the personal accounts of local lawyers, clients and those 
affected by lawyer behaviour.105 Not only does narrative readily engage the 
imagination, but real or fictional legal heroes may inspire students,106 while villains 
may bring home the unattractiveness of immoral behaviour.   
 When it comes to developing students’ ability to identify and resolve legal 
ethics issues, hypothetical ethical dilemmas may be useful. However, role plays and 
simulations are more likely to be effective in engaging their interest and emotions, 
introducing them to law’s human dimension and requiring greater attention to 
context.107 Active or experiential learning, in which students engage in roles, is said to 
have numerous educational advantages. Thus, where student experiences are more 
personal, immediate and realistic, and relate to the fulfilment of their future social 
roles, learning is more profound and likely to lead to greater self-knowledge.108 In 
addition, critical evaluation of performance by self and others in class and self-
reflective journals may enhance understanding and develop the life-long learning 
skills of the reflective practitioner.109 The ‘disorienting moments’110 or ‘moral crises’ 
which occur when prior assumptions and settled values jar with  experienced reality in 
role plays and simulations may stimulate an ‘engaged moral faculty’,111 whereas 
reciprocal role-playing encourages participants to see issues from the ‘other side’, 
thus hopefully developing empathy. Finally, the collaboration required in role plays 
and simulations may combat the individualism and competitiveness so pervasive in 
law school.  
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Whereas ‘fishbowl’ role plays112 involving a few students can be conducted in 
front of large classes, which then discuss the performance, they are obviously better 
conducted in small groups so that, as in simulations, all students can participate. 
Moreover, simulations are preferable to role plays because students are more likely to 
emotionally invest in their role when the results ‘count’. Where simulations are on-
going and particularly where linked to skills training, they may more accurately 
reflect practice, in which ethical questions of how to treat clients, other lawyers, court 
officials and third parties in a decent, honest and preferably also empathetic and 
caring way arise on a daily basis, rather than as the sort of isolated, dramatic and often 
irresoluble ethical dilemmas presented in hypotheticals and role plays.113  
However, it is generally accepted114 that the benefits of active, experiential 
learning are best obtained in live-client clinics.115 By engaging with actual clients, 
students are far more likely to develop empathy and emotional maturity. Learning is 
likely to be more profound when students bear responsibility for decisions which have 
consequences in the ‘real’ world. Whereas students might undervalue courses which 
abjure the ‘hard’ intellectual skills of legal analysis in favour of playing at being 
lawyers, not to mention reading, watching or listening to stories about lawyers,116 the 
presence of flesh and blood clients with actual problems is likely to make learning 
seem more useful than traditional legal education. Crucially, as we have seen,117 any 
feelings of satisfaction or regret at their actions in representing actual clients and real 
dilemmas may affect character development, whereas, involvement in community 
work contributes to moral development.  
Law clinics have other advantages. Dilemmas arise in a realistic manner and 
must be resolved without the luxury of ‘quiet and careful deliberation’.118 Because of 
their perceived practical knowledge and skills, clinic supervisors may function as 
influential moral exemplars, modelling good client relations, concern for how their 
actions affect others, and an altruistic commitment to the community. In addition, 
perhaps most importantly, clinics reveal the extent of unmet legal need, and social and 
legal injustice, that legal practice can involve helping others, and that this can be 
rewarding as well as intellectually challenging. My own and others’ experience 
suggests that this may inspire, or at least reinforce, altruistic aspirations in students.119 
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However, even those who recommend clinics as the most effective vehicle for 
ethical development believe that other forms of ethics teaching should come first.120 
And here the consensus is that, while certain issues of ‘macro ethics’, such as the 
impact and appropriateness of the adversary system and problems with access to 
justice can be discussed in existing courses, and ethical theory covered in 
jurisprudence courses, law schools ought to teach ethics both pervasively and in 
compulsory dedicated courses.121  
Addressing ethical issues as and when they arise throughout the curriculum 
redresses their current marginalisation, and demonstrates that they are integral to legal 
practice and vary according to contextual factors, such as the practice setting, the type 
of case and the client’s status.122 On the other hand, as Bundy argues ‘by giving the 
pieces of legal ethics a home everywhere, it effectively deprives its core concepts of a home 
anywhere…’.123 There is therefore a need for overarching theoretical and institutional 
issues, and multi-dimensional and interdependent substantive issues like 
confidentiality and conflicts of interest to be subjected to in-depth analysis in a 
dedicated course. Another problem with teaching professional ethics pervasively is 
that non-specialists may teach it in the same legalistic manner as traditional law 
teaching. Moreover, even well-intentioned academics might cut corners to ensure 
adequate coverage of their specialist topics, whereas hostile teachers may simply 
ignore ethical issues or make clear their disdain for having to waste precious time.124 
Against the background of the hidden curriculum, this is likely to encourage students 
respond to ethical interludes with dropped pen and raised eyebrow.125  
 
The Possible 
 
However, while in an ideal world law schools would teach ethics pervasively, as well 
as in dedicated course, support expository teaching with critical discussion, role plays, 
simulations and clinical experience, this seems a distant dream in the current 
university climate.126 Academics, quite justifiably, zealously guard their autonomy 
from outside interference.127  And, given the space taken up by the profession’s 
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dictation of the ‘core’, the argument for another compulsory course and/or for all 
courses to have a compulsory ethical element is likely to fall on deaf ears. There are 
already other more popular candidates for new compulsory subjects (such as 
evidence, unjust enrichment, the law of persons) or pervasive teaching (such as 
human rights, gender and race). Moreover, given the current ‘publish or perish’ 
pressure and the increasingly managerialist nature of universities, it is unreasonable to 
expect all law teachers to gain the necessary background knowledge and to rethink 
their courses in order to teach ethics pervasively,128 while preventing omissions and 
overlaps requires considerable co-ordination efforts.129 Yet, as the US experience 
shows, even compulsory ethics courses will be of little value if taught by ‘a reluctant 
cadre of junior faculty and outside lecturers’ and come to be seen as the ‘dog of the 
law – hard to teach, disappointing to take, and often presented to vacant seats or 
vacant minds’.130 
 Accordingly, perhaps the most that can be achieved is for more and more 
individual academics to establish optional ethics courses or incorporate ethics into 
existing courses, whether they be on the legal process, legal theory, substantive 
law,131 legal skills132 or involve clinical legal education. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that committed and enthusiastic teachers can inspire student interest in ethics.133  
Arguably, a few such teachers are more likely to have a positive effect than many 
teachers on compulsory courses raising ethical issues reluctantly, or with ill-disguised 
or open disdain. Moreover, students who become interested may raise ethical issues in 
other courses, thus encouraging ethics to spread throughout the curriculum.   
 If the aim of incorporating ethics into legal education has to rely on a gradual 
ripple effect, the sustained immersion in ethics, and the mentoring and supervised 
reflection required for character development seem to be an even more remote 
possibility. This is because relevant opportunities are only available in sophisticated 
and extended practice simulations or in live-client law clinics and both are highly 
resource-intensive as regards staff time and money. Consequently, student 
involvement is usually confined to a semester or at best a year, which is inadequate 
for sort of the moral apprenticeship that character development requires.134 Another 
problem is that engagement with ethical issues is likely to be de-prioritised in favour 
of other educational aims such as learning about how law actually operates and 
developing legal skills. In fact, clinics which prioritise educational goals over the 
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provision of legal services may even have a deleterious educative effect, teaching  
students that their own interests are predominant, and that clients are means to their 
(now educational but later commercial) ends rather than possibly vulnerable human 
beings with pressing material and emotional needs.135 This not only reduces the 
potential to positively influence the character of clinic students but is likely to confirm 
the attitude of those already disinclined towards ethical altruism.    
 Nevertheless, given that the development of extended simulations involving 
sophisticated ethical issues has yet to get off the ground in the UK,136 live-client 
clinics remain the best hope for a moral apprenticeship. However, to maximise their 
potential as I have argued elsewhere137 they ought to adopt a social justice, as opposed 
to an educational, orientation. By concentrating on ensuring access to justice rather 
than students’ educational needs, such clinics may also avoid the danger that 
supervisors, especially if recruited from practice, model the sort of harmful models of 
adversarial lawyering, competitiveness, insensitivity and client manipulation which 
has allegedly tainted US clinical legal education.138 Indeed, by prioritising social 
justice, clinics may achieve a secondary aim of encouraging students to see their 
professional obligations as including service to the community, particularly if they 
obtain great satisfaction from helping those in need and are impressed by the example 
of academics and practitioners who devote some of their spare time to clinic work.  
And in order to meet the two main concerns about clinics as sites of ethical 
education, social justice clinics are better operate better if they are extra-curricular 
rather than credit-bearing. The first of these relates to the cost entailed by the very low 
staff-student ratios thought to be necessary in traditional clinics.139 Costs can be 
further reduced by using students to help run clinics and even train incoming 
members. As a result, clinics like that at the University of Strathclyde140 can operate 
with the staff input of one part-time director and occasional legal advice from 
academics and local lawyers, and on a budget of around £5,000 raised from sources 
like local law firms or alumni associations. For this expenditure of money and time, 
over 130 students are involved, many for up to five years and therefore highly likely 
to encounter ethical dilemmas. This, and the fact that, as already argued,141 every 
instance of client representation requires an ethical stance, meets the other objection 
to clinics as vehicles of ethical education which points to the uncertain supply of 
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ethical dilemmas.142 Indeed, student engagement with ethics is extended at 
Strathclyde by requiring all ethical dilemmas to be resolved by a committee, 
constituted by around 20 per cent of clinic membership, who function as a 
Kohlbergian just community and publicise their decisions externally to the rest of the 
clinic. Moreover, in order to remedy the fact that students have no curricular exposure 
to professional legal ethics, a course has been introduced for clinic members who 
have at least a year’s experience to allow for guided reflection on ethical issues which 
arise in cases and on the interrelationship between their personal and professional 
moral identities. While this reverses received wisdom that clinical experience should 
follow ethical teaching,143 it accords with adult learning theory, which holds that 
adults learn best by using theory to reflect on past and existing experiences in ways 
which prepare them for future social roles.144  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article I have argued that student participation in extra-curricular law clinics 
combined with ethical discussion in clinical or other courses is the most likely means 
of ensuring that at least some begin a process of professional character development 
which incorporates ethical professionalism. Admittedly, not everyone is convinced 
that clinics will have this effect. Evans has argued that they can only confirm 
students’ pre-existing ethical orientations.145 However, his more recent research 
tentatively suggests otherwise,146 and significantly he and others who have reported a 
neutral147 or a negative148 impact have not looked at student’s long-term involvement 
in extra-curricular clinics. Moreover, as already noted,149 anecdotal evidence suggests 
that those students who join clinics merely to gain skills or pad their CVs may 
become committed to serving those in need once they begin to appreciate the sort of 
problems many face and gain satisfaction from making a difference to the lives of 
others. This might, of course be exceptional and such students may quickly revert to 
their initial more self-centred orientation once in practice. On the other hand, the 
sense of satisfaction at helping solve the problems of those in need and making 
correct moral decisions or the feeling of regret at making wrong decisions might start 
a process of professional moral character development which equips young lawyers to 
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resist the counter-pressures of modern practice or encourages them to practice in areas 
more amenable to ethical professionalism.  
 Equally, while arguing that the most likely means to begin this process of 
character development is through live-client clinics, I am not suggesting that all other 
means of equipping students for the moral challenges of legal practice should be 
abandoned. Not only will ethical teaching reinforce and help make sense of clinic 
experience, but legal education is currently so far from taking ethics seriously that any 
means of illuminating and illustrating professional legal ethics and inspiring student 
interest is worth pursuing even if it does not necessarily inculcate the sort of habits of 
moral conscience argued for in this article.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
